[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"blog-it-spa-api-session-refresh-patterns":3},{"id":4,"title":5,"author":6,"body":7,"cover":377,"description":378,"draft":379,"extension":380,"locale":381,"meta":382,"navigation":383,"path":384,"publishedAt":385,"seo":386,"seoTitle":387,"slug":388,"stem":389,"tags":390,"__hash__":392},"blog\u002Fit\u002Fblog\u002Fspa-api-session-refresh-patterns.md","Session e refresh token in SPA: pattern e errori comuni","Manuel Tardivo",{"type":8,"value":9,"toc":366},"minimark",[10,32,58,63,110,114,155,171,175,201,205,216,239,243,257,261,278,316,319,323,340,344,362],[11,12,13,14,18,19,22,23,27,28,31],"p",{},"Una SPA (React, Vue, Svelte…) che parla con la tua API deve decidere dove tenere ",[15,16,17],"strong",{},"access token"," brevi e ",[15,20,21],{},"refresh token"," lunghi. Le slide dicono “usa cookie HttpOnly”; in pratica molte app mettono JWT in ",[24,25,26],"code",{},"localStorage"," per comodità—ed espongono XSS ",[15,29,30],{},"long-lived",".",[11,33,34,35,42,43,42,48,53,54,57],{},"Questo articolo è framework-agnostico; in codice puoi applicarlo con ",[36,37,41],"a",{"href":38,"rel":39},"https:\u002F\u002Fauthjs.dev\u002F",[40],"nofollow","Auth.js",", ",[36,44,47],{"href":45,"rel":46},"https:\u002F\u002Flucia-auth.com\u002F",[40],"Lucia",[36,49,52],{"href":50,"rel":51},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.better-auth.com\u002F",[40],"better-auth"," o session server-side custom—the point è il ",[15,55,56],{},"modello di minaccia",", non il brand.",[59,60,62],"h2",{"id":61},"minacce-principali","Minacce principali",[64,65,66,84],"ul",{},[67,68,69,72,73,75,76,79,80,83],"li",{},[15,70,71],{},"XSS",": script malevolo nel DOM legge ",[24,74,26],{}," \u002F ",[24,77,78],{},"sessionStorage",". Gli HttpOnly cookie ",[15,81,82],{},"non"," sono leggibili da JS → preferiti per refresh (e spesso session id).",[67,85,86,89,90,93,94,97,98,101,102,105,106,109],{},[15,87,88],{},"CSRF",": browser invia cookie automaticamente. Mitigazioni: cookie ",[24,91,92],{},"SameSite=Lax"," o ",[24,95,96],{},"Strict"," per flussi “typical navigation”, ",[15,99,100],{},"CSRF token"," o pattern ",[15,103,104],{},"double submit"," per ",[24,107,108],{},"SameSite=None"," cross-site, oppure evitare cookie su API pubbliche cross-origin usando solo bearer da memoria (con tradeoff XSS più duro).",[59,111,113],{"id":112},"pattern-consigliato-alto-livello","Pattern consigliato (alto livello)",[115,116,117,127,149],"ol",{},[67,118,119,122,123,126],{},[15,120,121],{},"Access token",": breve TTL (5–15 min), tenuto ",[15,124,125],{},"in memoria"," JS (closure\u002Fstore volatile) quando possibile. Se serve persistenza tra tab, valuta cookie di sessione wrapper lato API piuttosto che localStorage.",[67,128,129,132,133,136,137,140,141,144,145,148],{},[15,130,131],{},"Refresh token",": ",[15,134,135],{},"cookie HttpOnly + Secure + path stretto"," ",[24,138,139],{},"\u002Fauth\u002Frefresh",", renew con POST dedicata. Rotazione: ogni refresh emette ",[15,142,143],{},"nuovo"," refresh e invalida il precedente server-side (store con ",[24,146,147],{},"jti"," o session table).",[67,150,151,154],{},[15,152,153],{},"Revoca",": blacklist \u002F versione sessione sul server così un refresh rubato smette dopo un round.",[156,157,162],"pre",{"className":158,"code":159,"language":160,"meta":161,"style":161},"language-http shiki shiki-themes github-light github-dark","Set-Cookie: refresh=...; HttpOnly; Secure; Path=\u002Fauth\u002Frefresh; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=...\n","http","",[24,163,164],{"__ignoreMap":161},[165,166,169],"span",{"class":167,"line":168},"line",1,[165,170,159],{},[59,172,174],{"id":173},"cosa-evitare","Cosa evitare",[64,176,177,185,191],{},[67,178,179,184],{},[15,180,181,182],{},"Refresh in ",[24,183,26],{}," salvo threat model esplicito (es. solo mobile embedded WebView con altre guardie).",[67,186,187,190],{},[15,188,189],{},"Lunghi access token"," “perché così facciamo meno refresh”—composti il rischio device rubato.",[67,192,193,196,197,200],{},[15,194,195],{},"Multiple refresh concorrenti"," senza dedup: quattro tab possono generare quattro sessioni—usa mutex client (",[24,198,199],{},"refreshPromise"," condiviso) o endpoint idempotente.",[59,202,204],{"id":203},"spa-api-su-altro-dominio","SPA + API su altro dominio",[11,206,207,208,211,212,215],{},"Se frontend è ",[24,209,210],{},"app.example.com"," e API ",[24,213,214],{},"api.example.com",":",[64,217,218,232],{},[67,219,220,221,224,225,224,228,231],{},"Cookie cross-subdomain: ",[24,222,223],{},"Domain=.example.com"," + ",[24,226,227],{},"Secure",[24,229,230],{},"SameSite"," coerente con flusso OAuth\u002FPKCE che usi.",[67,233,234,235,238],{},"Alternativa moderna: ",[15,236,237],{},"Backend-for-Frontend"," stesso-site che fa proxy—riduce complessità CORS\u002Fcookie.",[59,240,242],{"id":241},"logout","Logout",[11,244,245,246,249,250,252,253,256],{},"Cancella cookie refresh con ",[24,247,248],{},"Max-Age=0",", invalida server-side ",[24,251,147],{},", e azzera store client in memoria. Se ti basta ",[15,254,255],{},"logout locale"," senza chiamare API, il refresh rimasto valido è ancora pericoloso.",[59,258,260],{"id":259},"rfc-9700-bcp-240-refresh-per-client-pubblici","RFC 9700 (BCP 240): refresh per client pubblici",[11,262,263,264,269,270,274,275,215],{},"Il ",[36,265,268],{"href":266,"rel":267},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rfc-editor.org\u002Finfo\u002Frfc9700",[40],"RFC 9700"," (",[271,272,273],"em",{},"Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security",", BCP 240) è la “linea guida OAuth2” aggiornata (2025). Per questo articolo, la sezione rilevante è la ",[15,276,277],{},"replay detection sui refresh token",[64,279,280,304],{},[67,281,282,283,286,287,290,291,136,294,297,298,300,301,31],{},"Per ",[15,284,285],{},"client pubblici"," (tipico: SPA senza secret) l’authorization server ",[15,288,289],{},"deve"," usare ",[15,292,293],{},"refresh token rotation",[271,295,296],{},"oppure"," token sender-constrained (DPoP\u002FmTLS). Con la rotazione, ogni refresh risponde con ",[15,299,143],{}," refresh e invalida il precedente; se qualcuno riusa un refresh già consumato, il server rileva competizione legittima vs attaccante e può ",[15,302,303],{},"revocare la catena",[67,305,306,307,269,310,315],{},"Testo utile da citare in review: ",[271,308,309],{},"“If a refresh token is compromised and subsequently used by both the attacker and the legitimate client, one of them will present an invalidated refresh token…”",[36,311,314],{"href":312,"rel":313},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rfc-editor.org\u002Frfc\u002Frfc9700.html",[40],"RFC 9700 §4.14",").",[11,317,318],{},"Non è “paper teorico”: è lo standard di riferimento quando integri IdP seri (Auth0, Keycloak, Azure AD, …) con grant browser-based.",[59,320,322],{"id":321},"riferimenti","Riferimenti",[11,324,325,42,330,333,334,339],{},[36,326,329],{"href":327,"rel":328},"https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FSession_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html",[40],"OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet",[36,331,268],{"href":266,"rel":332},[40],", e ",[36,335,338],{"href":336,"rel":337},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.rfc-editor.org\u002Frfc\u002Frfc6749",[40],"RFC 6749"," per terminologia refresh\u002FOAuth—adatta al tuo grant; molte SPA usano session custom invece di OAuth puro.",[59,341,343],{"id":342},"sintesi","Sintesi",[11,345,346,42,349,42,352,42,355,358,359,361],{},[15,347,348],{},"Refresh HttpOnly",[15,350,351],{},"access corto in memoria",[15,353,354],{},"rotazione + revoca server",[15,356,357],{},"dedup refresh",". ",[24,360,26],{}," per secret lunghi è la scorciatoia più costosa che vediamo in produzione.",[363,364,365],"style",{},"html .default .shiki span {color: var(--shiki-default);background: var(--shiki-default-bg);font-style: var(--shiki-default-font-style);font-weight: var(--shiki-default-font-weight);text-decoration: var(--shiki-default-text-decoration);}html .shiki span {color: var(--shiki-default);background: var(--shiki-default-bg);font-style: var(--shiki-default-font-style);font-weight: var(--shiki-default-font-weight);text-decoration: var(--shiki-default-text-decoration);}html .dark .shiki span {color: var(--shiki-dark);background: var(--shiki-dark-bg);font-style: var(--shiki-dark-font-style);font-weight: var(--shiki-dark-font-weight);text-decoration: var(--shiki-dark-text-decoration);}html.dark .shiki span {color: var(--shiki-dark);background: var(--shiki-dark-bg);font-style: var(--shiki-dark-font-style);font-weight: var(--shiki-dark-font-weight);text-decoration: var(--shiki-dark-text-decoration);}",{"title":161,"searchDepth":367,"depth":367,"links":368},2,[369,370,371,372,373,374,375,376],{"id":61,"depth":367,"text":62},{"id":112,"depth":367,"text":113},{"id":173,"depth":367,"text":174},{"id":203,"depth":367,"text":204},{"id":241,"depth":367,"text":242},{"id":259,"depth":367,"text":260},{"id":321,"depth":367,"text":322},{"id":342,"depth":367,"text":343},"\u002Fblog\u002F33_spa_api_session_refresh_patterns_1x.webp","Dove tenere session e refresh token in una SPA, come ruotarli, e quali minacce restano realistiche con cookie o bearer verso le API.",false,"md","it",{},true,"\u002Fit\u002Fblog\u002Fspa-api-session-refresh-patterns","2026-05-26",{"title":5,"description":378},"Session e refresh token in SPA: errori","spa-api-session-refresh-patterns","it\u002Fblog\u002Fspa-api-session-refresh-patterns",[391],"mvp","00zXfI8LEGsP_y4gU55lGYCK4bpZJOo4QLB78diCR0Q"]